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':37 .S 9 3 June 195 9. 
1. ·~e First National Bank of Ironclad was the holder of an unsecured note in the 
amount of $101 000, signed by Muskrat. Upon the bank's request Muskrat executed a 
deed of trust upon an unimproved lot to secure this debt, which deed of trust was 
immediately recorded. Muskrat then undertoe~ to erect a building upon this lot. He 
employed Shoestring Construction Co., a general contractor, to erect the building. 
Shoestring completed the construction of the building and, upon Muskrat's failure to 
pay, perfected a mechanic 1 s lien in the amount of :IJ)lO,OOO within the requisite sixty-
day period. Muskrat has become insolvent. In an appropriate suit to enforce the 
mechanic's lien, the court fixed the value of the vacant lot as of the date of sale 
at $5,000. At the sale the property brought $12 1 000. 
As between Bank and Shoestring, how should the purchase price be divided? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) V#43-21 the recorded deed of trust of the unimproved land is a 
first claim on the land and a second claim on subsequently erected buildings, and 
the mechanic's lien is a first claim on the improvements that gave rise to the lien 
and a second claim on the land reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the 
building. So Bank receives :$5,000 and Shoestring receives ~P7 ,000. 
q. ~q 
2.~n 1~55, Ghastly bought an orchard in Clarke County,Va., subject to a certain 
deed of trust for $20 1 000 1 which deed of trust had been executed a number of years 
previously to secure a note, in the same amount, payable to Shark. As a part of the 
purchase price, Ghastly assumed and bound himself to pay the balance due on the 
$20,000 note , with interest as it became due . During his lifetime Ghastly made pay-
470. 
menta on the note with the result that at the time of his death in 1958, the total 
amount of the indebtedness had been reduced to $16,000. The orchard was devised to 
Fiend by Ghastly's will, the will making no specific mention of the indebtedness of 
Ghastly on the note secured by the deed of trust, nor did the will direct the ex-
ecutor to pay the · note. Fiend contends that the balance due on the note secured by 
the deed of trust should be paid out of Ghastly's personal estate. The general 
legatees of Ghastly's personal estate contend that the real estate remained the 
principal source for the payment of the lien indebtedness and that the persomal 
estate was only secondarily liable therefor. A suit in equity has been filed in the 
Circuit Court of Clarke County for determination of this question. 
How should the court rule? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS--WILLS) Fiend is correct. A secured debt is a debt and the first 
property taken to pay debts (unless the deceased provides otherwise)is personal 
property at large not otherwise disposed of. Fiend is a specific devisee and a 
specific devise is the last thing taken to pay debts. See 185 Va.l60 on p.l707 of 
Wills in these Notes. 
c..z5 _.r:- / 4~1 2 • 
8. Groundhog, a farmer, obtained a $25,000 loan from Merchants Bank, for which he 
executed his note, payable in 60 days, with his brother, Ferret, as accommodation 
endorser. Later Ferret learned that Groundhog was insolvent and he induced Groundhog 
to execute a deed of trust on his house to secure Ferret as endorser on said note. 
Said trust was promptly recorded. At the time he obtained the loan from Merchants 
Bank, Groundhog had a number of unsecured creditors. Upon learning of the trust 
that Groundhog had given upon his property to Ferret, the unsecured creditors con-
sult you and inquire whether the deed of trust to Ferret may be successfully 
attacked as voluntary and fraudulent and as creating a preference. What would you 
ac;ivise? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advise .that it could not be attacked. The debt is a real 
one as the accommodation indorser is liable and will have to pay. It makes no 
difference whether Groundhog secures the Bank or the endorser. At common law one 
may prefer one bona fide creditor to another. Since Groundhog is a farmer he cannot 
be thrown into involuntary bankruptcy and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act con-
cerning preferences have no application. See 200 S.E.629,633 on p.200 of Bankruptcy 
Cases in these notes. 
/) 5" 1 3 December, 1959 
1. .ver Sniftless was an electrician at the Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, 
earning $85 a week. In August,l959, as a gesture of brotherly love, he delivered 
to his unmarried sister, Neva Shiftless, a birthday gift of ten U.S. bonds payable 
to bearer, each in the denomination of $100. At that time,his financial affairs were 
in good order, although he owed Grocer a bill of $200. In September, Shiftless fell 
out of bed at home, seriously injuring his back. The bill of Hospital was so great 
that he was unable to meet his obligations and became hopelessly insolvent. 
Both Grocer and Hospital desire to subject the bonds to payment of their respec-
tive debts, and they ask you {a)whether the gift was void as to Grocer,(b)whether 
the gift was vo;Ld as to Hospital, and (c)whether in a suit to set aside the gift 
Shiftless could successfully plead as a defense that they had not obtained judgments 
against him. How should you advise them as to (a),(b), and (c)? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS)(a) .The gift is void as to Grocer. By V#55-81 voluntary gifts are 
void as to those creditors of the donor who are owed debts at the time of the gift, 
regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the donor at that time.(b) The gift is 
not void as to Hospital, as Hospital was not then a creditor of Shiftless, nor was 
the gift made to defraud anticipated creditors.(c) By V#55-82 no judgment need be 
obtained as a condition precedent to avoid the gift. 
· -
• 
• 
·::::r.:: c, f) · 3 June 1960. 
1. Debtor owned and operated Blackacre, a large dairy farm in Wythe County, Va. 
On January 2, 1958, he executed a deed of trust on Blackacre to secure Adams 
$10,000, which was promptly and duly recorded. 
At the April, 1959, term of Wythe Circuit Court, Best obtained a judgment against 
Debtor for $5,000. This judgment was not docketed, and at the June,l959, term of 
this court, Clark obtained and docketed a judgment for $8,000. On August 4,1959, 
Davis, to whom Debtor owed a note for $7,500, asked Debtor to secure this note or 
pay it. Debtor said: "I can't pay it but I will give you a deed of trust. There is 
one deed of trust on the farm now and some judgments against me. You can look about 
these at the Courthouse but I will give you the deed of trust." The next day Davis 
went to the Clerk's Office and found that the Best judgment had been obtained but 
that it was not docketed. He made no further investigation or inquiry and that day 
Debtor executed the deed of trust to secure the $7,500 note. This deed of trust was 
promptly recorded. Debtor a.Lso owed $10,oo'o in open accounts. 
Which, if any, of these debts are liens against Blackacre and what is their 
priority? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Applying the. following principles(a)vfuere everything else is 
equal prior in time is prior in right,(b)Docketing is not necessary as between 
ereditors,(c)One who purchases land(and a deed of trust creditor is a purcha,ser) 
with actual notice of a prior lien takes subject thereto, and(d) While judgment 
creditors have liens, open account general creditors do not, we find that all of the 
debts, except the open account onas, are liens against Blackacre and that the order 
of priority is Adams, Best, Clark, and Davis. 
Q.l on p.500(Creditors Rights). The former rule that docketing is unnecessary as 
between creditors is no longer law due to a change in V#B-386 to the effect that a 
judgment is not a lien on realty until it is recorded(docketed) on the judgment lien 
docket of the clerk's office of the county or city in which the land is situated. 
The Adams lien is first because it is a duly recorded first deed of trust, Clark is 
second because he has docketed his judgment thereby giving constructive notice to 
subsequent parties, Davis is next because of his duly recorded second deed of t~1st ~ 
So far Best and the open account creditors are on a par, but if Best dockets his 
judgment he will have priority as of that time unless in the meantime other liens 
have been perfected. 
b D , .. ~ bee ember 1960 516. 1~ Will Worker worked for ~ llW!lber of yeat! in a smalls tore in Lynchburg, Va. He had 
managed to put his only sort through colle~e and had built up a small savings 
accolinU He now yearned to lead a more exciting life. Fast Buck, a friend who lived 
on the Eastern Shor~ of Virginia, induced Will to invest in his racing stable. Will 
Worker, using th~ $6,000 he had in the bank and $4,000 he borrowed from his son, 
invested $10,000 in the stable. The venture was prosperous for a while, but then 
began to fail. Will Worker soon realized he was insolvent in the sense that he 
didn't have the present ability to pay his creditors if they pressed for prompt 
payment, but he felt reasonably sure his creditors would forebear. Will Worker 
owned a small farm in Campbell County Virginia, which was valued at $4,000,and whi~ 
he conveyed to his son in satisfaction of the debt due him, saying, "In case I go 
breke I want to make sure you get paid." 
Henry Smith, a creditor of Will Worker learned of the conveyance to Son, and within 
sixty days of same filed a bill in equity in the proper jurisdiction to have the 
above conveyance set aside and declared null and void on the €rOUnd that it was in 
fraud of Will's creditors. Will's son cornea to you seeking advice. What would you 
advise him? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advise him that his father had the right to prefer one 
bona fide creditor over another. There is nothing fraudulent in paying and receiving 
what is honestly due.(Note that the question asks nothing about possible bankruptcy 
proceedings.) 9 M.J.,Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances #41. 
2J>~~n Needy owned considerabl~ rental real estatef!~t;e:~~~n;ei~~i~~~ ~i: 
personal property consisted ma~nly of househ~~do~fconsiderable means, his fortune 
rentals for his sustenance. Joe Abl; was~ mf th which he had successfully managed 
consisting of securities inh~ited ro~ ed~ a~d ~ie were close friends, cognizant 
and controlled for a n~ber 0 yearst.h e iii iG&fil~ ~and shared each 
of the financial condit~on of each o er, 
other's confidence. erties for the two•fold purpose of 
Ben Needy wished to imprdve his Lein~o~ proptal values but found that he needed 
their preservation and an inc~e~s~of K~~~e~hat some of Joe Able's securities 
considerable money to a7complis tsinterest Ban Needy suggested to Joe Able that it 
yielded him less than f~ve per c~nf Able ~ sell some of these securities and lend 
would be to their mutual interes or er cent interest. Able agreed to this. 
him the money which ~f need~~ a~ sd~t~dness was discharged, Ben Needy died. Upon 
A year later, and ~ ore e ~n fi · nt to pay off the debt, Able 
learning that Needy's personal ~~~te ~: !n~~fNe~~;, 8 re~l estate be sold to satisfy files a bill in equity praying athen ~und that the rents and profits from the 
the debt. Needy's heirs defend.on. eig d hence the property should not be 
realty will satisfy the debt w~thin f v? years, an 
sold. What should be the resul~ ofT~~si:u~!! a bill to enforce the lien of a judg-
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Able should ~n. stated would be valid, but a 
ment brought ~der V#8-30l iln wdhl.cfh t~as~e~~e~~f:s~is general debts • See 177 Va.411 creditor'~: su~t to subject an o e 
r.;·± 3 June 1961. 
1,.">b n F'ebruary of 196o, an automobile driven by Hyram Jones collided with one driven 
by John Apple at the intersection of Ninth and Main Streets in the City of Richmond. 
Each party claiming the other was at fault, no settlement of the controversy could 
be made. On Nov.3,1960, Apple brought an action against Jones in the Law an ,;!£quity 
Court of the City of Richmond seeking damages of $50,000 allegedly sustaineJ py him 
as a result of the collision. Jones promptly filed a counterclaim asking da..tges of 
$40,000. In January of 1961 Jones, being advised by· his lawyer that he had ~ a 
fifty per cent chance of winning the case, by the execution and delivery of ~ppro­
priate instruments made a gift to his wife Sally of all his property, excepting only 
his interest in the home place which was held by him and Sally as tenants by the 
entireties. On June 8,1961, the case between Apple and ,Jones was tried and the jury 
returned its verdict for Apple in the sum of $h5,ooo. On this verdict, judgment was duly entered. 
Apple, having learned of the gift made by Jones to Sally, and understanding that 
Jones has insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, asks your advice on what 
grounds, if any, he might bring a suit in equity to have the gift made by Jones to 
Sally set aside. What should you advise him? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Apple may have the gift set aside on either or both of two 
grounds. It was a fraudulent conveyance since: .. made with the intention of hindering, 
delaying, or defrauding creditors, and it was~~oluntary ~conveyance void as to' exist-
ing creditors by statute(V#55-8l)whether or not he retained sufficient assets and 
whether or not the claim against him was liquidated or unliquidated. 
Q. 1 on p.562(b) The law stated in this portion of the answer is changed by the 
u.c.c. which allows a security interest in inventory(shifting stock of merchandise) 
provided that .a proper financing statement is filed. Even if such a statement is 
filed, a purchaser of inventory in the ordinary course of the seller's business is 
protected even if the purchaser has actual knowledge of the security interest. 
• 
• 
. ( . 3 D~cember 1961. . 
1.P{gThomas Tobias owed many debts totalling $)0 ,000. Tob1.as made a ge~ral asslgn-
ment for the benefit of his creditors, conveying to a trustee all of hls property. 
The property held by the trustee was sufficient in value to pay all of ~o~ias' debts, 
including the cost of any suit that mjght be brought/ to enforce and admlnlster the 
trust. The trustee failed to act with promptness in the administration of the trust 
and Hobson one of •robias' creditors, instJ.tuted a chancery suit for the purpose of 
enforcing the trust. 'l'he ot her credi tors vrere made , parti~s t~ t~1is 
1 
su~ t, a~d the 
litigation was protracted. Dur·i ng the pendency of 0he su1. t, fobJ.as mfe ~led tes-
tate and by her will she devised to her husband all of her real es~ate hanng a. 
value of $25,000. Shortly after her death, and before t he conclus1on ?f the chan-
cery suit to enforce the tru.r.;t, Hobson obtained a judgment against Tob1.as and sought 
to enforce satisfaction of the judgment by a suit instituted for the purpose of sel-
ling the real estate acquired by Tobi as from his wif e. Tobias co~sults yo1:l' and in-
quires whether Hobson may maintain the suit to sell the land acqmred by h1m from 
his wife in view of the pendency of the prior suit against the trustee to enforce 
547. 
t1r.e trust f or the benefit of Hobson and the other creditors. 
In the absence of a statute controlling the rights of the parties what would 
yo1.1. advi se? 
( Cii.EDITORS RIGHTS) I would advise Tobias that Hobson is acting properly. When 
Hobson became a judgment creditor he obtained a lien on Tobias ' after-acquired 
r Galty. He can enforce his lien on this realty W"hether or not he has other methods 
or collecting as long as he does not receive more than his debt from both sources. 
Even if the doctri ne of electi on did apply, it would not be applicable here as the 
original ci:::·cumstances have changed. He could not be expected to elect Hhether he 
Hould go after the trustee, or after the l and until Tobias had t he latter. See 99 
Va . 163. 
1:~ ;v page 562. 3 June 1962 .. 
1. John Barter, an automoblie dealer in Richmond,Va., attempted to purchase for re-
sale fifty new Chevrolets from General Motors, but his purchase order was refused 
because the balance due on his open account for automobiles previously bought from 
General Motors stood at $75,000 and was six months past due. In order to make the 
purchase, Barter issued his check to General Motors for $75,000 to pay off the 
balance of the old account. Barter knew t~t he had no money in the bank, and, upon 
presentation by General Motors, the check was dishonored. 
In his subsequent discussions with General Motors, Barter disclosed that his 
business had been failing and that he was insolvent. However, he assured General 
Motors that if it would hold off proceedings against him for thirty days, he would 
make good the $75,000 check. General Motors assented to that proposition. 
Barter then described his plight to his rich aunt, Henrietta Ford. Mrs. Ford 
loaned him $75,000, taking as evidence thereof Barter's demand note in that amount, 
secured by a deed of trust, duly recorded, on the stock of automobiles held fer 
sale in his business. Using the money he obtained from Mrs. Ford, Barter took up 
the dishonored check from General Motors. 
E.Z .Mark, one of Barter 1 s chief creditors, had recently obtained judgment against 
Barter and had leviJed on the automobiles. Learning of Barter's transactions with 
General Motors and Mrs.Ford, Mark consults you and asks you what rights, if any, he 
has enforceable in the State court(a)against General Motors and (b)to set aside t te 
Henrietta Ford deed of trust. How should you advise him as to (a) and (b)? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS)(a) As far as State law is concerned a debtor may prefer one bona 
fide creditor over another, so that Mark has no remedy against General Motors in a 
State court.(b) A deed of trust on a shifting stock of merchandise is void in 
Virginia as to purchasers in due course and creditors. Mrs. Ford, by leaving Barter 
in charge has given him the power to sell off the merchandise and defeat all credi-
tors. "From Levy v. Lee, 3 Rand. 410, decided in 1825, until the present time, it 
has b~en uniformly held by this court that such a mortgage ~~ on a stock of goods, 
wares and merchandise *** which contains provisions adequate to defeat its purposes, 
is null and void as against creditors and purchas~rs' of the grantor. The cases 
are too numerous to cite" Judge .Eurks in Boice v. Finance etc. 127 Va.563. 
·~ I 
~G. I 
2 . .V Bass filed a bill in equity against Trout in the Circuit Cou!'t of Culpeper Coun-
ty, Virginia, on behalf of himself and all lien creditors of Trout. The lien crE'd-
Hors of Trout >Tere made parties defendant to the bill. In the bill of complai.:-:.t 
Bass averred that he had obtained a judgment against Trout , in the sum of $6,000, 
in the County Court of Culpeper County, and that said judgment had been duly docket-
ed in the judgment lien docket of the Circuit Court of that County. An abstract of 
said judgment was filed with the bill of complaint as an eYJlibit. The lien credi-
tors of Trout, who had been made parties defendant , ans1rrered the bill of complaint 
and joined in the prayer thereof that the cause be referred to a Master Commissioner 
in Chancery to ascertain and report the Hen debts in the order of their priori ties, 
and that the real properties of Trout , subject to the liens of his creditors, be 
sold for the payment of the lien debts. 
Trout demurred to the bill of complaint upon the ground that the alleged judgment 
of the plaintiff in the amount of $6,000 <Jas vcid , and that the court was without 
jurisdict-ion to enter tain the suit. The trial court over:r'Uled the demurrer, and the 
cause was referred to a Master Commissioner 1,.1ho reported the liens in the order of 
their priorities, and that the rents and profits would not pay the debts in f ive 
years. Among debts reported as liens VJas t he $6 ;000 claim of Bass. 
Upon exceptions to the Commissioner's report, the t6al court held that the 
judgment obtained by Bass vms void, but aVJarded judgment t o Bass for $6,000 in t he 
creditor's suit, as it appeared to the court from evidence returned with the Commis-
sioner's report that Trout was indebt ed to Bass i n the sum of ~i6,ooo . The court 
further decreed the sale of Trout's properttes and directed th&t:. the net proceeds 
of tho sale be applied to the po.yment of all of 'l'rout t s lien creditors , including 
the claim of Bass. Upon an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals Trout contended: 
(a) That the demurrer should have been sustained on the gvound that the court was 
without juri sdiction to entertain the suit at t he instance of Bass; 
(b) That the trial cour t erred in awarding judgment to Bass; and 
(c) That the court erred i n decreeing the sale of Trout 1 s properties. 
How should the court rule on each of these r:ontentions? 
( CPF.I'ITCBS RIGHTS) (a) 'rhis contention should not be sustai ned because the lien 
creditors of Trout are now properly before the court and tl1ey have a r ight to have 
the matter decided. Had Bass been the onl.y person involved tl1e demurrer VJould 
have been proper since the complaint shows on its face that Bas s has no lien. 
(b) This contention is correct. Bass hCJ.s no standing t o invoke the assistance of a 
conrt of equity to foreclose the lien of his judgment until he obtaj_ns a valid judg-
ment. The maximum jurisdictional a'T!ount of a county court is $2,000. Obtaining 
the judgment is a purely ler,al matter. 
(c) There is no error here as the lien creditors in the case are ent itled to the 
relief asked for. See 171 Va. 19h. 
" ·:r-- 3 December 1962. 
l.rtJones, unmarried, owns (l)a residence, (2) shares of stock in a Virginia corpora-
tion, and (3) a savings account in a local bank. He owe.:r:J your client $3,000, 
evidenced by a past duo note. 
How, if at all, may this property be subjected to thC' payment of client's debt, 
asswning that both your client and Jones a>:-e residents of Virginia. 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Get a judgment against Jones. This judgment is a lien on his 
residence. File a bill in equity to enforce the lien of the judgment. See v#B-391. 
As to the shares of stock they may be levied upon and seized or, they may be reach-
ed by equitable process aided by injunction if needed. See Burks Pleading and 
Practice(4th Ed.) pp.694 and 695 and V#l3 .1-413 and 414. 'l'he bank account may be 
reached by garnishment proceedings. 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1\,~rown, on April 1,1962, obtained jndgm~r..-~ in the CirGuit Cout"t of Wythe County', ·· 
aga1nst Carson for $1,2$0. This judgm~nt was promptl;,.- docketed and an eecuti<.·~l. 
returnable in ninety days. issued thereon and went into the hands of the Sheriff 
~·;ay 1,1962 • Carson, a fannel', owned real estate encumbered for more than its value; 
be also owned five pure-bred steers worth approximately $2,000 and a well-drilling 
outfit worth $1,000. On Nay ~,1962, Carson executed and recorded a deed of trust on 
the steers and well-drilling outfit to secure ratably $2,500 owed to his wife and 
$1,000 owed to a bank for money which he had borrowed from them. On June 7,1962 
the Sheriff levied the execution on all the personal property mentioned above. ' 
Assuming that homestead exemption is waived as to all these debts, what are the 
priorities, if any, and rights of (a)Brown, (b) the wife, and (c) the bank? 
(CREDI'l'ORS RIGHTS). The lien of an execution on personal property is effective when 
the writ of fieri facias is placed in the hands of the proper officer, in this 
case, May 1, even as against a bona fide purchaser for value in the case of tangible 
personal property. Thus Brown has priority. The Bank and the Wife come next equally 
and ratably since both debts were bona fide debts. See Burks Pleading and Practice 
(4th Ed. )#370. 
4~@holesaler•s Incorporated recovered a judgment against Easy Credit. A writ of 
fieri facias was issued thereon and placed in the hands of the Sheriff for levy, 
~it being returnable on June 14,1963. Before the return date the Sheriff made 
a levy on all pers9na~ property in Easy Credit's Office. Easy Credit before the levy, 
but after the w:i:it had been placed in the hands of the Sheriff, and sold to Joe 
Hock for $500 an antique clock kept in the office. At the time of the sale, Hock 
knew nothing of the judgment of Wholesaler's Incorporated or of the writ of~ 
facias. On June 12,1963, the Sheriff levied on the clock in possession of Hock. 
May the Sheriff now sell the clock free of the claim of Hock1 
5'93 .. 
('~~ED:::TOHS RIGHTS) Yes. Burks Pleading and P:racUce #373 of the fourth edition :c e.?. r l~ 
i l'l part, "Tangibla property. In Virginia, if the property is capable of bdnt?; le.vi~d 
on~ the liem of the fi. ra. is superio:r to the rj_ghts of purcha.sars wi::::"th or-wi t hoi:\·:; 
P.oti~e of the fi. fa-, provided a levy is actually made on or before the return day 
of the writ.•1 'TFie lien of the fi. fa. a·i:.tached when the writ of fieri faci.s.G was 
d.J:l.ivered to the officer to beexe'Cuted. V/18-411 and 8-h13. 
L~ 3 December 1963. 
1 .D samuel Pepys, the sole proprietor of a drug store in Waynesboro, Va., was heavily 
indebted to Albert Rexall one of his suppliers who was engaged in business in the 
City of Richmond. Pepys became increasingly-delinquent in paying his bills and 
Rexall, fearing that Pepys might ultimately become insolvent, on November 1,1963 
obtained from Pepya a chattel mortgage to secure payment to him of Pepys' indebted-
ness. The chattel mortgage, which was duly recorded by Rexall on the afternoon of 
November 1st, recited the transfer to Rexall of all merchandise then in the drug 
store, provided that foreclosure could be made if the indebtedness was not paid on 
or prior to December 2nd, and further provided that Pepys in the meanwhile could 
continue the operation of his drug store in the usual manner. 
Pepys having paid nothing on the indebtedness, on December 4th Rexall went to 
waynesboro for the purpose of foreclosing the chattel mortgage. On his arrival in 
Waynesboro, Rexall learned that on November 29th, Geoffrey Chaucer had obtained a 
judgment against Pepys, that the Sheriff in execution of the fieri facias issued on 
the judgment had levied on all Pepys 1 merchandise, and that t~eriff had ad-
vertised the merchandise for sale at public auction on December 16th. Rexall prompt-
ly brought a suit against both Chaucer and the Sheriff in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Waynesboro in which his bill in chancery alleged the foregoing facts,and 
prayed that an injunction be granted to prevent the Sheriff's sale of the merchan-
dise. Chaucer and the Sheriff have each demurred to the bill. How should the Court 
rule on the demurrers? 
. OJ.v. 
(CREDITORSRIGHTS) The demurrers should be sustained. The chattel mortgage was void 
as ~o Pep?s' creditors because it allowed Pepys to keep full control of the property 
and· sell ~t in the regular course of business. Un:ier such circwnstances there is no 
·reason why Rexall should ·be any better off than Pepys' other creditors. Benedict v. 
1Ratner 268 u.s.353. 
3 June 1964. 
_,.,_< 
h ; ttJ se~l. Spector owns a farm worth $10,000, a television set vmrth $'700, an auto-
mobile worth $2,800, and a diamond brooch worth ~$1,000. He owes Small Los.n Co. $300, 
has doctors' bills amounting to $500, and unpaid grocery bill of $600, and he OvJes 
Discount House, Inc., $3~000. None of these credi~rs have reduced their claims to 
judgment. Discount House, Inc., threatens to comrrJence an action to recover the 
$3,000 due it, and to avoid this action Spector transft:Jrred to Discotmc House, Inc., 
the title of his automobila in exchange for a release and satisfaction of this ob-
ligation. Spe~tor~ out of J.ove and af.fe~tion, gave his da•1ght.er the diamond brooch 
and, in order to put his farm beyond the reach of his creditors, he conveyed his 
farm to his son in exchange for the son 1 s worthless shares of st~ck in the Tooner-
ville Trolley R.s.ihray Company, a defunct corporation. Six months after all of the 
foregoing transactions, Frank Foolish lent to SpGctor $3gOOO, and ·t.hereafter Spector 
made a gift of his t~;levision set to his own wife. Socn thereafter Foolish demanded 
payment of the ~S) _,OOO and was sho~ked to learn that Svce:tor had no asset.s. FooEsh 
consults you and inquires wtu:::ther he may rec:J.ch any of the assets formerly owned by 
Spector. What 1v-ould you. acl.vis~·l 
(CREDITORS RIGH1'S) I ·t-iould a.d\'~. se th8 B'oclish can reach the television set that 
Spector gave to his wife as su;;;h a volliilt.a:::-y gift is void in Virgin:i.a as to existing 
creditors whether or not the donor is still s olvent after having made the gift. He 
can also reach the $10 11 000 .fc:.::m as that \.Vas conveyed with intent tm defraud credi torr 
and is void in Virginia as to all credH.ors vrhether present or subsequent. He cannot 
reach the di2111ond brooch becaur;e he was not a cre:di tor of Spe•-::tor a-li that time. He 
cannot reach the automobile . be·;;ause i:1 Virginia one has the right to prefer one 
bona fide creditor to another. See #/fol09~. and l096 of Minor on Real Property(Ribble) 
" 
2 .Jf.b~n ~ and Sa7ings Bank , Inc., recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Alber-
marle County, Vaop ag:.rinst 1JI!illiam Frail :i..n th<; sum of $l2 »000, and consults you, 
requesting that you advise whether tha judgment is colle<': tible . Upon investigation 
you fir.d that Frail owns no property, but that six months before you were consulted 
he was struck by an auto:nobile while walking on a sidt::N'alk in Charlottesville, and 
as a result he sustained serious bodily inJuries. 'l'he oper:a:to::- of the automobile was 
Maggie Smith, Frail ' s mother-in~ la-w, a '-: <::alt,hy wtdow. Upon reporting your findings 
to Loan and Savings Bank, Inc., you are asked whether the Bank may tc:Ll<:e any ao tion 
against Maggie Smith to effe;Jt collection of its judgment against Frail. 
What would you advise'l 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advi1:1e that Bank has no recourse a gainst Haggie Smith, 
A cause of action for personal i nju.:riDs cannot be assignf::d, attached, or garnished 
but is purely personal in nature. See #57 of Burks Pleaclj.ng and Practice(4th Ed.). 
3 December 196L. 
1. Bill Crenshaw had been trcding with J oe Dudley for severa.l years by selling auto ... 
mobile tires and accessories to him. Dudley had one place of business, and a sign 
on the door read 11 Joe Dudley and Cvmpany-"·D5.scount Tire a::1d Auto Acc essories." 
Fred Finley, Dudley's father-in-law, in fact, owned t b.\3 bm:;iness, and Dudley was 
only paid a sa.lary and commission, but there was no indication of this on the door 
or on any signs or s tationery nor had there bee n publication of any notice or any 
recordation in any clerk's off ice. However, when Cren::;hm.;r first started dealing 
with Dudley, he asked why Dudley used the term 11 and Company_. 11 B.nd Dudley said, 
1:My father-in- l aw, Fred Finley, i3 J."eally behind all t his. I am just a lackey." 
The business fell so far behind in paying its debts owed to Cr ~nshaw that Crenshaw 
brought suit and obtained a judgment against Joe Dudley on whieh execution was 
levie,d on all the property of the business and its a:.~counts receivable. Fred 
Finley, thereupon, in proper proceet~.ings .• e.sse:cted. hi.s title to all the property, 
claiming to be the true owner ther e')f . 
Is Crenshaw entitled to enfo:;:-co his lien against the business property on his 
judgment againt::t Dudley? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS ) Yes. V~L~5-l52(the Traders Act ) wns not r.vr.~plied with by notices 
in writing posted in the stor e and publice,t.ion of notice r.s ~Jet fo rth in the 
statute . Knowlsdge of the true situa~ion is :bn..'ll.atierial if there has been no 
compliance. See V#SS-152 and anno t ations thereto. 
• 
• 
• 
3 June Exam 1965. 
1. Ambitious owned several building lots in the rapidly growlng town of Boom, Va. 
Desiring to acquire more land Ambitious borrowed from Industrial Bank $20,000 and 
secured its repayment by a mortgage conveying to Indus·~rial by metes and bounds de3-
cription the building lots then owned by him and also ~•an other real estate which I ., 
Ambitious, may acquire during the life of the mortgage". This mortgage was properly 
recorded. Later Ambitious bought an off5.ce building in Boom and while the foregoing 
mortgage securing Industrial was outr;tanchng, scld it to Purchaser. Along came a 
depression <md suit W·9.8 institut ed to foreclose the mortgage on the lots and office 
building. Purchaser intervened and claimed that his ·i:,:Ltle vras superior to the rights 
of Industrial as to the ofEce building. How Ollght t he Cotn··J; to hold? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Purchaser's title is superior . The recorded mortg3.ge.:~ as far as 
the office building is concerned, is outside the chain of '!:.itle and hence not con-
structive notice to Purchaser. He was under no duty to s e e whether or not Ambitious 
had mortgaged the office building before A..Yl;bitious had any interest. therein. See 
3 Glenn on Mortgages 414. 
5£ ~/ 
2. Debtor executed and properly recorded a deed o f trus t conveying Blackacre to se-
cure Bank the payment of a loan evid enced by his note f or jPS,OOO due one year after 
date. This debt wc:.s paid at maturity and the note 1<.ras marked n(;;ancelled 11 by Bank 
and delivered to Debtor. The deed of trust "t<Jas not released of record. One Year 
later Debtor, being in financiP..l diffict.~lties a ppli8d tc Bank for another loan of 
~~5, 000 which was granted and the parties agreed that it s hould be secured by the old 
deed of trust and so endors ed to that effect on the note. Behreen the times of these 
t~vo transactions CI'editor had obtained and prcperly docke t ed a judgment against 
Debtor for $4,000. Debtor o-vmP.d no property except Blackacre and it Has worth only 
$6,000. What are the respective rightc of Bank and Creditor as r e spects Blackacre or 
the proceeds from its sale? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Creditor has priority over Bank. When the first $5,000 note was 
paid the debt was discharged and the s ecuri ty for it absol utely ceased. It was dead. 
Bank should have released the deed of t n 1s t, and cannot stand in a better position 
because of its failure to do Hhat it should have done. Soo 1 Glenn on Mortgages 328o 
3 December 1965 
1. Blackacre, the home of H and w, had be~n acquired hy them in 1960 as __ tenants by _ 
the entirety wi"l:,h tM right of sur •r:ivorshlp as a t common laH. In Januru: y 1965, they 
sold Blaclcacre to Richard Ro e and H directed that the net pr oce7ds of the sale be 
d 1 . d to w vrhich -vras done. B8cause of an unsuccecsful buslness venture, H ha.d e lvere ' . d . t h" . 19 ~ 1 Th~ ~e become very much involved an:l judg.r.ents were obtalne aga1.ns lm ln o.,J.. _ - · ·~ 
j d t creditors hc:.vo inst·~tuteci suit agains :; W' to recover one-half of the ne t p~ore!~s of the r:;ale of Blac:(:".cr~ cnnten~ing t!'l;·:l:. th~ p~~e~.t to her of ·.H ' s part 
of the proceeds ·w-as a !".'raud on lns credi·c.ors a~1d tha r, tn""y L; Ould collec u the 
share that, H ha l give~1 w. . d f -~ 
w consults yoll and wLmts t ,r) be a.dYi~ed as t o whether she can successfully e en .... 
the action. Wh2..t advice wo ,l ld yo u g1.ve her'i' +. 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Yes, she can succesBfully de~e~dtthdebatCv lOf'nh. P;opedrtydh~~df asTh 
b th tl. 1,, .~y is lJ.' !1'"-1'"' only frn· the ·1 oln e s '·.. us oan an W1. e. . e tenants y .e en . "''J c. u , _ ... . _,· · .. . -. 
d ising f ·r om the S·'3. l e of such p":'.;Jper t y are a L o he~d a s ..,enantu by thr-procee s a r - . t b " , t • · d - , ' 
entirety. A gift of pr ope!'ty by a debtor which l S no ::::u .J8·.; ·c o ru s eu cs can:1o-c 
be a ~raud on his creditors • 
~ ))fv} 
2. Debtor borrowed $15,000 from A and gave as security a deed of trust on his farm 
in Roanoke County, Va. Although the deed of trust recited t hat the indebtedness wn.s 
evidenced by a promissory note of even date executed by Deb L.o r for $15,000, paya.'ble 
to A 90 days after date, no such m t e was ever deliveJ.~ r; -:l to A. The deed of t rt'.SC 
was properly signed, acknowledged and dehvered by Debt or to A on t he day he r e-
ceived the money, and A duly recorded it that day in the Clerkis Office of the 
CirC!uit Court of Roanoke County. 
R:! .. xty d&.ys later X secured a judgment against Debtor for $25,000 vJhich was dnly 
c o~ketcd in the Clerkts Office of the Circuit Court of Roanoke County~ Shortly 
thereafter X instituted a suit in ·t,he proper court to sell the farm in sat:\.sf-?.e:t:Lon 
of the judgment. he had secured against Debtor. The court has referred the mat ter 
to you as a commissioner in chancery to ascertain the liens against the fa:i.'m and 
their respective priorities. The farm was worth only $30,000 , X has contundsd l n 
this proc3eding that A's deed of trust was void, as no note or bond eviden.:;:..!!g t he 
$15~000 indebtedness had been delivered to A, 
How ought you to report on the validity and priority of the asserted liens 0f 
A and X'l 1 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) A's deed of trust has priority. It is the debt that is secm·ed .. -
not, th13 note evidencing the debt. Equity regards that as done whiL'h ought to have 
been dope and will treat the transaction as if the note had been given& 
3 June exam 1966. 
1. John Pegram comes to see you and states that Mike Mack, a resident of Hanover 
County, owes him $2,500, which is due on an unsecured loan made by Pegram to Mack 
in 1964. Pegram also tells you that Mack has, refused to pay the loan, and that the 
only asset owned by Mack is an underveloped and unencumbered parcel of land situated 
in Hanover County. He asks you what steps, if any, he make take to have Mack's land 
subjected to the payment of the $2,500 debt. What should your advice be? 
• 
(CREDITORS RI,GHTS) Pegram should bring an action at law against Me~k in the Hanover 
Court for ~,500. The judgment in this action will be a specific :u. ~m on all of 
Mack's land within Hanover County and Pegram can then file a bill in equity to en- ~ 
force this lien. If the Chancellor determines that the rents and profits of all land 
subject to the lien will not satisfy the judgment within five years, he may order a 
sale of as much thereof as is necessary to discharge the judgment.(Note: Pegram 
must obtain a judgment but need not exhaust his remedies at law before proceeding 
against the land). 171 Va.l94, 176 Va. 16, Code 18-391. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
- -
<,fo7 5~Sells Auto Supply Distributor of Richmond, Va., had been trying to induce Byers 
Auto and Tire Shop, a retailer of Richmond, to purchase Sells' products consisting 
of hydraulic jacks of a special deaign for use in Byer's tire-selling operation and 
a new type non-skid automobile tire for resale to Byer's eustomers. Byers agreed to 
purchase two hydraulic jacks at a purchase price of $200 each with the understanding 
that he would try using them for thirty days to see if they fitted the needs of his 
operation, and if so, he would pay for them, and if not, they would be returned 
to Sells at no cost to Byers. B,yers also agreed to purchase ten tires at a price of 
$30 each for sale to the public at $50 each with the agreement that if he could not 
sell all of the tires within thirty days, all unsold tires could be returned to 
Sells with Byers paying only for those that had been sold. 
Sells delivered the two jacks with an invoice marked 0 Sale on Approval" and the 
ten tires with an invoice marked 0 0n Consignmentn, these being the only documents 
of sale. Fifteen days after delivery, Sells made inquiry of Byer$ and was told that 
Byer's employees liked the jacks and that they ~pparently would do the job but 
Byers was not yet positive about purchasing the same, and Byers also advised that 
three tires had been sold. The next day Crenshoaw, a judgment creditor of Byers, 
for an amount exceeding the value of all the property on the premises, levied on 
all of the property of Byers through proper proceedings. Sells, through proper pro-
ceedings, sought return of the two jacks or their value, and the seven tires or 
their value, plus$90.00 that being the amount for which three of the tires had been 
sold. 
Is Sells entitled to: (l) return of the two jacks or value, 
(b) return of the seven tires or value, and 
(c) the payment of $90. . 
(CR&DITORS RIGHTS)(a) Yes, Sells is entitled to return of the two jacks or value. 
8.2-326(2)(UCC) When ••• goods held on approval are not subject to the claims of 
the buyer's creditors until acceptance. 
That Sells printed, ttS&le on Approvaln on his invoice is immaterial; however, 
this was a true "sale on approval" since the goods were delivered primarily for use 
within 8.2-326(l)(a), and not for resale. 
(b) No. Sells is not entitled to the return of the seven tires or value. 
8.2-326(3) when goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintaine 
a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name 
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to calim of 
creditors of the person conducting the business, the goods are deemed to be on 
sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an 
agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or 
resale or uses such words as " on consignment" or rt on memorandum". 8.2-326(2) 
••• goods held on sale or return are subjeot to such claims while in the buyer's 
possession. 
(c) No. Sells is a general creditor, as the sale has taken place • 
1))6/editor obtained a judgment for $30,000 
Wise County, Va., on which an execution was 
of the sheriff of that County. The Clerk of 
judgaent on the judgment lien docket. 
3 December 1967 
against Debtor in the Circuit Court of 
promptly issued and placed in the hands 
the Court, however, failed to record the 
At the time the judgment was rendered, Debtor owned the following property:(l) a 
store house in Wise County worth approximately $10,000,(2) a residence in that 
County worth about $7,500 1 (3) a herd of cattle in Wise County worth about $101 000, 
and (4) a bond of Farmer for $15,000. 
After the execution went into the hands of the sheriff and before its return day, 
Debtor (1) sold the store house for $9,500 cash to Merchant, who knew of the judg-
ment,(2) ~onveyed the residence as a wedding present to his daughter, who knew 
nothing of the judgment,()) sold the herd of cattle to Frazier, who knew nothing 
about the judgment, and in whose possession the cattle were at the time the sheriff 
l evied on them pursuant to the execution and,(4)collected the bond from Farmer, who 
also knew of the judgment. 
What are the rights, if any, of Creditor to subject the following property to the 
satisfaction of his judgment: 
(1) the store house, (2) the residence, (3) the cattle, and (4) what liability, 
if any, rests on Farmer? ~~-(CREDITORS RIGHTS) (1) Every judgment for money is a lien on realty of which the 
defendant is possessed only from the time such judgment is recorded. V#8-386. Since 
Creditor's judgment was never recorded, no lien attached to Debtor's land. 
2. Though a gift is not void as to subsequent creditors, it is void as to prior 
creditors. Hence creditor can reach the residence. 
3. Creditor ~an get the cattle, as a writ of fieri facias on chattels binds those 
chattels from the time it is delivered to an officer to be executed. V#B-411. 
4. No liability rests on Farmer. ~s against a person making a payment to a judgment 
debtor, a lien on intangibles shall not affect such person; unless and until he be 
given notice thereof in writing. VIB-432. 
• 
• 
